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A suitable touch of the recondite to begin: in prefacing a recent edition of his Empire 
of Honour: The Art of Government in the Roman World, J. E. Lendon noted that the 
book’s ‘several critics were fairly evenly divided between those who found the 
argument preposterous and those who found it so obviously true that it did not need 
saying. The author is delighted, therefore, to refer the former to the reviews of the 
latter, and the latter to the former’ (Lendon 2001: v). That would deal adequately with 
most reviews so far of Modernism and the Grounds of Law (Fitzpatrick 2001). It 
would however be ungracious and, even worse, impolitic not to be a little more 
nuanced than this about the beautiful and elegant reviews offered by Goodrich and by 
Norrie (Goodrich 2003; Norrie 2003). Yet insofar as Norrie would find me too wild 
and Goodrich would find me not wild enough, to refer one to the other is an obvious 
temptation. In succumbing to it, I will have to drain away the element of premature 
triumph because I want the alternation not only to be settled but also to remain 
unsettled. More pointedly, it is in the necessity yet impossibility of such settlement 
that law is iteratively impelled into existence. That is a thought provoked by the 
reviews and, by way of engaging with them, it is a thought I will now elaborate on, 
pretending it was all along the gist of the book. 
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But how to do this at all adequately? Brevity is at least advisable in responding to 
reviews. To protest too much is tiresome for all involved and deservedly self-
defeating. Yet these two reviews are so intense, refined and diverse that they do call 
for a response that is carefully attuned and extensive. An advisable brevity has, 
however, been made imperative by gentle editorial direction. What I will try to do, 
then, is to focus a great many things through what seem to be my two more egregious 
sins of omission: the disregard of the feminine and of law’s constituent dependence 
on  the social. With so much having to be so severely accommodated, succinctness 
may come across as sharpness, but the idea behind this little piece is the same as that 
which Goodrich and others have generously discerned in the book: an avid openness, 
the continuance of non-closure. 
As a prelude, I will condense the notion of law argued for in the book, that notion 
which others find either obvious or  preposterous. It concerns the settlement in terms 
of a normative continuity of the existential divide between a determinate positioning 
and a responding to what is beyond position. Obviously and preposterously, these are 
different things yet also the same, since there can be neither enduring position without 
responsiveness to what is always beyond it, nor effective responsiveness without a 
position from which to respond. In their separation yet inexorable combining, these 
two dimensions could be taken as the horizon of law, as a moving horizon – the 
horizon both as a condition and quality of law’s contained being, and the horizon as 
opening onto all that lies beyond this being. Law’s position within that horizon cannot 
be at all irenically set. The assertion of determinate position has always to be made in 
relation to the infinitely responsive, and it was this responsive dimension of law 
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which the book was most concerned to advance. In so doing, it was, of course, setting 
itself against the epochal elevation of occidental law’s determinate dimension over the 
responsive. That elevation involved a forgetting of the once-revolutionary dimension 
of modern law, its being unsettling of any fixed rule. Instead occidental law becomes 
oriented towards its dimension of determinate settlement in an acquisitive, even 
imperial mode. But that was not enough to secure a secular certainty and the 
monumental strategy containing the force of law in modernity has been its 
instrumental subordination, its being rendered as the instrument of a sovereign power, 
of society, and so on. With renditions coming out of ‘critical’ work and the politics of 
identity, the subordinating instrument becomes a dominant class, a dominant gender, 
and so on. All of which can hardly be to deny that, if law continually becomes itself 
and is sustained in its responsiveness to exteriority, there must nonetheless be a 
positioned place where this responsiveness can be made determinate. That which is 
purely beyond is merely inaccessible, and out of responsive range. So, law not only 
comes from but also returns to determinate position. And to sustain position there 
must be some shielding from an importunate responsiveness. There has, with any law, 
to be a constant, reductive effort to ensure that ‘the aleatory margin…remains 
homogeneous with calculation, within the order of the calculable’ (Derrida 1989: 55). 
Yet, further, the very holding to a position requires a creatively accommodating 
responsiveness to what is beyond the constitution of that position ‘at any one time’, a 
responsiveness to ‘[a]ll things counter, original, spare, strange’ that would impinge 
upon and affect it (Hopkins 1970: 70). Law’s determinations cannot be conclusively 
predictable and ordered when it has to exceed all fixity of determination. It remains 
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pervaded by the relation to what is beyond, labile and protean to an illimitable extent. 
This impossibility of invariant positioning is what makes law possible. Even at its 
most settled, or especially at its most settled, law could not ‘be’ otherwise than in a 
responsiveness to what was beyond its determinate content ‘for the time being’. If that 
content could be perfectly stilled, there could be no call for decision, for 
determination, for law. And it is in the very response to this call, in the making and 
sustaining of its distinct content, that law ‘finds itself’ integrally tied to, and 
incipiently encompassing of, its exteriority.  
Yet no matter what is encompassed, law’s responsiveness, its generative 
incompleteness and its refusal of any primal attachment, makes law intrinsically 
dependent and derivative, quite lacking in any content of its own. As one 
jurisprudential tradition would require, law must ever  and constituently respond to 
‘society’ and such. This same imperative for law to derive its contents from elsewhere 
resonates with a contrary jurisprudential tradition elevating law’s autonomy. An 
insistent responsiveness, an intrinsic inability to be bound to any pre-existent, would 
require that law remain ‘pure form’ and surpass any of its contents, modifying or 
rejecting them. Here law ‘affirms itself as law and without reference to anything 
higher: to it alone, pure transcendence’ (Blanchot 1992: 25). Before the law, before 
this force of utter origination, its contents ‘for the time being’ become entirely 
contingent on its assertion. Law itself becomes ‘absolute and detached from any 
origin’ anterior to itself (Derrida 1992: 194).  With its vacuous purity, with the 
incipience of its always being other and exterior to itself, with ‘the very movement by 
which it formulates this exteriority as law’ (Blanchot 1993: 434), law has somehow to 
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be conceived of, not just in a potential relation to what is outside what it is ‘for the 
time being’, but as having that outside with-in itself. 
In the book, this conception of law was drawn out of various entities with which it 
seemed constituently complicit. One such entity, the first, was the origin, the origin as 
that creative combining of what lies ever beyond yet corresponds determinately to 
that which is originated – a combining which always ‘manages’ to be the origin of 
what we are now. The origin also provided apt relief from exordial agony and the 
book began with a modern myth of origin in which, as it transpired, law and the origin 
were found to be homologous. I would now like to find in the margins of this myth a 
counter to Goodrich’s charge, fervently laid, that I quite ignore the feminine, although 
it should be admitted at the outset that this counter will be almost as overplayed as the 
charge itself. As Goodrich so poignantly revealed, in a way that for me was both 
confirming and challenging, in the book’s insistent openness there was an enwrapping 
of its style, its theory and its approach to law. The book could hardly, then, 
accommodate a primal or resolving feminine, any more than it could the totemic trio 
of given excitations which Goodrich would associate with this feminine: the psyche, 
desire, and the body. 
The telling of the opening myth came from Freud’s renditions of the killing of the 
primal father, the main one being in Totem and Taboo (Freud 1960: chapter IV). The 
initial scene takes place in the desolate stasis of a ‘primal horde’ gripped in the 
unlimited power of the father, a power extending to the monopoly of access to the 
women of the horde. Finding a ‘chief motive’ in their exclusion from the women, the 
sons band together, kill and eat the father (Freud 1960: 144). The father’s place of 
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complete determination disappears with him and for ‘mankind’ there has since never 
been any settled ‘rest’ (Freud 1960: 145). In the vertiginous possibility that ensues, 
the sons realise eventually that there has to be an ordering of access to women and, 
so, an attendant social compact comes to elevate a refined paternal authority. The 
animate quality of that compact was concentrated in the totem. The totem was, in 
combination, the surrogate of the father and the first manifestation of human law. And 
the first laws to emerge were prohibitions on incest and on the killing of the totem 
animal. Thence, the women ‘had been set free’ – although, as I sensitively observe, it 
has apparently taken some time for the news to get around (Freud 1960: 143; 
Fitzpatrick 2001: 15). This putative freedom of the women is not just from the 
domination of the primal father but also from the claims on them of the sons. Yet 
there is no effective emplacement of this freedom in a world made by the sons and 
pervaded by paternal authority. The making of that world now assumes continuance 
normatively in ‘a duty to repeat the crime of parricide again and again in the sacrifice 
of the totem animal, whenever, as a result of the changing conditions of life, the 
cherished fruit of the crime – appropriation of the paternal attributes – threatened to 
disappear’ (Freud 1960: 145). Paternal rule endures in its seeming solidity only 
through its own repeated extinction and renewal. And in terms of the myth, and in 
terms of my book's 'obsession', it is the figure of the savage that in itself unites law’s 
solidity within with its transgressive exteriority, and for this purpose the savage has to 
be found both within determinate law and beyond it (cf. Goodrich 2003: 111). 
Freud joins a great many others in equating the savage and the feminine (e.g. Freud 
n.d.: 145-6; and more generally see Fitzpatrick 2001: 64, 223). As we have just 
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observed, the dubious freedom of the women in Freud's founding myth meant that 
they were contained within an ordered sociality yet they were not of it, and as such 
they were also beyond it. That same mix can be extracted from Freud’s following 
Bachofen and finding that ‘matriarchy’ was replaced by ‘the patriarchal organization 
of the family’ (Freud 1960: 144; Fitzpatrick 2001: 220; and see Bachofen 1967). 
Here, in the synchrony of myth, the feminine is of an ordered sociality yet absent 
from and beyond it. Like the savage, then, the feminine can negatively unite the 
determinate and the self-transgressive dimensions of law, can combine its being 
within with its exteriority, and it can do so in a way which makes possible the 
predominance of the determinate in conceptions of occidental/civilized/patriarchal 
law. Since that law takes its coherence in negation of the savage/feminine, it can ‘be’ 
determinate yet responsively absorb its transgressive exteriority without ‘positively’ 
or markedly being disrupted by that responsiveness. The force of law dissimulated in 
this manner can be discerned in Blanchot’s The Madness of the Day in which the 
feminine becomes the law – in which it comes to be and is becoming to the law 
(Blanchot 1981; Fitzpatrick 2001: 83-4). Blanchot’s feminine law emanates from 
‘me’: she ‘is born of the one for whom she becomes the law’, and she is abjectly 
dependent on this all-powerful, determinate one (Blanchot 1981: 14-15). But that 
dependence is also inverted by the law herself. Having become the law, she then 
comes from beyond me and denies me a place anywhere and the ability to do 
anything: ‘she exalted me, but only to raise herself up in her turn’ (Blanchot 1981: 
16). In the evanescent interval between my being determinate and what is ever and 
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incipiently beyond that being, all the law will allow is a fleeting touch of her body 
(Blanchot 1981: 16). 
Blanchot’s feminine law not only concentrates the counter to my first supposed sin 
of omission, it also contains the response to my second, the disregard of law’s 
constituent dependence on the social. Indeed, the story so far could be read as 
preliminary to an engagement with ‘a fateful inversion’ which Norrie discovers in my 
extracting a rarefied version of law from Freud and only then moving on to something 
like Norrie’s own totemic trio of the social, the political, and the historical – and in 
this way I disregard the imperative of deriving law’s ‘essence’ from them (Norrie 
2003: 121, 127). Agreement of a kind can now readily ensue. In its vacuity, law finds 
content in an abject dependence on the social, and such. It is this vacuity of modern 
law that has facilitated its subordination in the instrumental. But this same law in its 
very vacuity, and expanding on Blanchot for a while now, would challenge and deny 
the plenitude, the completeness of the social, the historical, and the political. In so 
doing, it would be at one with the Derridean  groove along which Norrie would propel 
my argument, aptly enough. That argument is set against, to take an example and 
borrowing from Lefort, ‘an illusion which lies at the heart of modern society: namely, 
that the institution of the social can account for itself’ – an illusion engendered in the 
claim of society, in the absence of any reference beyond it, to have become 
‘transparent to itself’ or ‘intelligible in itself’ (Lefort 1986: 184, 201, 207). Or it 
would be set against a self-validating history, against historicism. Or it would be set 
against the sedimented politics of sovereignty. Still inveterately borrowing, Derrida’s 
description of sovereignty as ‘a secularized theological concept’ could be applied to 
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all of the trio (Derrida 2001: 49). Each would assume the deific ability to combine in 
itself being determinate with an illimitable efficacy, combine a self-subsistent 
presence with the capacity ever to extend incorporatively beyond itself. These are 
characteristics which resonate with those I have extracted from law. If law is to 
connect to society and such, there has to be some recognizable similarity between 
them. As I tried to show in the book, society did not simply affect law from afar. 
Rather, it was a matter of society being suffused by law in a reciprocal relation with it 
(Fitzpatrick 2001: e.g. chapter 4). Reciprocity could still be compatible with law’s 
ultimate dependence, but this was countered, I hope, by an initial account of society’s 
constituent dependence on law for its cohering and for its commonality, and this was 
a dependence on law as vacuity (Fitzpatrick 2001: 45-54). That account of society 
was derived from my opening engagement with Freud. Hence, I provided a boringly 
monadic trajectory rather than a fateful inversion,  something which does sound much 
more interesting. 
There is one final reversal I would like to indulge in. The exquisite cadence of 
Goodrich’s title, ‘Tristes Juristes’, attunes us to a pervasive theme of his article, the 
seductiveness of which I would want to resist (Goodrich 2003: 109). That theme 
mixes the elegiac with resentment at the life I have spent, or misspent, in the law, my 
book being then a rather long goodbye, a goodbye to all that. Before fading into the 
crepuscular gloom, I would want to evoke some of the joy in the work, especially in 
that openness which Goodrich also discovers there, that 'delirious' resistance to what 
is enclosed and complete (Goodrich 2003: 118). This insistent openness of the style 
and theory of the work merges with law’s liberatory promise, with its ability always 
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to traject beyond the existent. As with Tristes Tropiques, the titular inspiration, 
tristesse is more in the situation depicted than in the author (Lévi-Strauss 1992). This 
is the sadness of the obvious.  As both Goodrich and Norrie note, my general 
rendition of law does not strain originality. Norrie confirms this in telling of how 
MacCormick, as a legal positivist, ‘is able to formulate a theory of legal interpretation 
which accommodates determination and openness without recourse to a Derridean 
understanding’ (Norrie 2003: 128). But I do locate repeatedly some such 
accommodation, as a peremptory resolution, in the common course of both the 
practice and the theorization of law (e.g. Fitzpatrick 2001: 86-9). The sadness here is 
that of the obvious as a denial and the obvious as what is denied. Occidental law’s 
resolving accommodation lies in its denial, in its enfolding and darkening of law’s 
responsive radiance. Perhaps then my concern with Freud as social theorist, and with 
Freud of the ‘forever unfinished’ Totem and Taboo (Cixous 1991: 24),  should have 
embraced the concept of repression and brought it to bear on our ability to deny or 
attenuate the obvious. And perhaps also that concern should have embraced more the 
‘impossible’ Freud who would enhance the contrary ability to render creatively, rather 
than to ‘resolve’, conflicts that are irresolvable ‘in any case’ (Castoriadis 1994: 3; and 
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